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COMPUTATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
by 
Pieter H.M. Ruys and Gerard van der Laan 
1. Introduetion. 
General equilibrium models in economie theory are isomorphic to fixed point 
theorems. This insight is due to Von Neumann [18], who applied Brouwer's fixed point 
theorem to prove the existence of a process of proportional growth in a competitive 
economy. McKenzie [11], Arrow and Debreu [1] and other authors used this tooi in the 
fifties to prove existence of an equilibrium for the model designed by Walras [19]. They 
thus have put the general equilibrium model for an economy with private goods only 
and with private ownership, on a solid axiomatic foundation. 
The mathematical tools were strong enough to extend the economy with public 
goods, a concept introduced by Samuelson [15]. The concept of public goods has been 
studied intensively, see e.g. Cornes and Sandler [3]. The problems raised since Samuelson 
in public good models are more related to economie behaviour and institutions than to 
mathematical limitations. One of the fundamental issues in the theory of public goods is 
the individual's revelation of preferences about the provision of public goods. It is 
individually rational to behave as a free rider, but it is socially harmful. Many solutions 
for this problem have been proposed and rejected. It is still an unresolved issue in 
economie theory. For a recent survey we refer to Blümel, Pethig and Von dem Hagen 
[2]. 
In this paper we develop and use the concept of a semi-public good, introduced 
by Ruys [14]. A semi-public good is defined as an ordered pair of commodities, the first 
one being a private good and the second one a public good. The amount y1 of 
consumption of agent i of the private commodity and the amount z of availability of the 
public good are related to each other by an individual inequality constraint y ^ ^ z ) for 
each agent i. This constraint might be implicitly expressed in the consumer's utility 
function or the producer's production function. But the explicit formulation makes it 
possible to distinguish between whether an individual constraint is binding or not. If for 
some agent, say consumer i, the constraint is binding, then an increase of z has a direct 
effect on his demand because of the fact that z appears in the consumer's utility 
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function, but also it has an indirect effect through the weakening of the constraint. The 
price for raising z offered by a truth-telling consumer will reflect the impact of both 
effects on his utility. The part reflecting the constraint will show up as a mark-up on 
the market price the consumer is willing to pay for the private commodity. If no agent 
in the economy feels himself constrained, the semi-public good reduces to a private good 
having a uniform market price, and a pure public good with, if desired, Lindahl prices. 
In general, the definition of a semi-public good is relevant only if the constraints are 
binding for a considerable number of agents. 
The main advantage of this approach is that economie institutions can be 
designed which make price discrimination possible among users of a semi-public good. 
People who are seriously hampered by too small a provision of a public good, because it 
constrains their use of the private commodity, are thought of forming (political) pressure 
groups to expand its provision, or are informing the industry otherwise. They are also 
willing to pay a mark-up on the price of the private commodity if this mark-up is spent 
on expanding the provision of the public good. In the context of an industrial economy 
the enterprises in an industry discriminate between consumers by setting different 
prices, and not the public authority or planner. These differentiated prices inform the 
planner and partially finance the public good. 
We will explore a model in which there is just one industry producing private 
goods, which form semi-public goods with a public good. The infrastructure of this 
public good is planned and organized by a central planner. The consumer's willingness to 
pay an individual mark-up on each of the prices of the private commodities reflects his 
preferences for the infrastructure of the public good. These mark-ups are collected by 
the private goods industry and transferred to the central planner in order to cover the 
costs of the public good infrastructure. As an alternative the private goods industry may 
levy a uniform mark-up on the prices of the private commodities to provide an 
infrastructure necessary for using their products. We call this framework of a central 
planner and private firms providing together semi-public goods an industrial economy. 
It is evident that there are many spill-over effects resulting from any decision 
about the provision of a semi-public good. This calls for a general equilibrium approach, 
with an associated fixed point or zero point formulation. In order to calculate a fixed 
point, simplicial algorithms first have been designed by Scarf [16,17] and Kuhn [6,7] for 
fixed point problems on the unit price simplex. Van der Laan and Talman [9] developed 
a variable dimension algorithm for problems on the unit simplex. Similar algorithms for 
fixed or zero point problems on R n have been introduced by van der Laan and Talman 
[10], Wright [20], Kojima and Yamamoto [5], and others. These algorithms allow for f ast 
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movements in lower dimensional spaces and are therefore very efficiënt. A code for 
these algorithms has been implemented on the computer by Seelen, see [9]. We will use 
this code for solving some numerical examples to illustrate the framework of an 
industrial economy. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the framework 
of an industrial economy by giving some examples. The mathematical model is given in 
section 3. In this section we also state the first order conditions for a Pareto efficiënt 
allocation. The institutional framework to reach a Pareto efficiënt allocation is given in 
section 4. In section 5 we give some numerical examples to illustrate the concept of an 
industrial economy. Finally, in section 6 we make some concluding remarks and we 
discuss the possibilities for further research. 
2. An industrial economy. 
An industrial economy consists of a number of (small) enterprises which produce 
private commodities that are close substitutes or complements and which have a common 
interest in maintaining the availability of a public good, called the infrastructure. The 
presence of an infrastructure increases the utility of the private goods or may even be a 
necessary complement to them. Examples are: 
a. airline transportation: several carrier companies provide substitutable transport 
services; they have a common interest in for example airports, a reservation network, 
safety measures. 
b. tourist industrv: there are many enterprises providing services that are close 
substitutes and complements (hotels, restaurants, entertainment, travel agencies); these 
enterprises have a common interest in for example a clean and attractive environment, 
promotion activities and a reputation for good quality of services. 
c surface transport: there are several modes of transportation which are close substitutes 
and complements (bicycle, car, taxi, tramway, bus, railroad); for each mode there are 
one or more enterprises providing transportation services; producers of a mode have a 
common interest, such as a road or a railroad system, and time and working schedules. 
There are much more examples, of course, but the three given here are specific 
in some aspects. In example a) the private goods are close substitutes. The enterprises 
compete and they are comparable. Moreover, there is only one public good for all, called 
the infrastructure. In example b) the private goods are both substitutes and complements. 
The enterprises can be clustered in various branches each having a completely different 
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production technology (hotels, attractions, souvenir shops), and most of the branches are 
competitive. The common infrastructure is induced rather than planned and organized. 
In example c) the private goods are again close substitutes and complements (trains have 
connections with buses). Some modes of transportation are competitive (taxis), but other 
are monopolistic and regulated. Again there is a common infrastructure from which 
some of the modes may benefit and some others may not. This infrastructure is planned. 
The central problem in all examples is the way on which the infrastructure is 
provided and financed. In the air industry example it seems to be obvious that the 
enterprises organize and finance the infrastructure and pass on the costs in the prices the 
consumers have to pay. However, the consumers also benefit directly from the 
infrastructure. It enlarges their possibilities to travel and therefore they should also show 
a willingness to pay for having an airport. On the other hand, people living close to the 
airport may suffer from its noise. We have similar characteristics in the other examples. 
For organizing and financing the infrastructure we distinguish the following cases: 
i) the infrastructure is not planned or decided upon, but it results from unorganized 
individual actions of the agents (e.g. it is attractive to do shopping in a city with a wide 
variety of supplies) 
ii) there is an agent (a government or a private enterprise), who provides the 
infrastructure and who determines tariffs or prices for making use of it (e.g. a shopping 
center or airport). An agent can decide to take or leave the offer 
iii) the infrastructure is planned and organized by an agent who has been established by 
the enterprises and by others who have interest in the production of the industry. 
Case i) is not relevant for our problem. Case ii) gives a way out of our problem 
if the agent providing the infrastructure is economically self-supporting or can make 
prof its. It remains interesting to analyse the rules of price setting with the theory 
developed here. Our approach is mainly relevant for case iii). In this case either the 
infrastructure is not apt for private (or profitable) exploitation, or there are political, 
juridicial and other non-economic elements involved that influence the productivity of 
an industry and its chances of survival. In the next section we present a model for this 
case. From this model we derive conditions for an efficiënt allocation. These conditions 
show that the prices the agents are willing to pay for the private commodities reveal the 
preferences for the infrastructure. 
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3. The matheniatical model. 
We consider a model of an industrial economy with two semi-public goods, 
composed from private goods a and b and a public good. For example, the public good 
is a road system that is used both by private cars, a, and by public buses, b. There are 
two other commodities, private goods 1 and 2. There is a (possibly private) producer 
who plans and organizes the level of the infrastructure, z, taking into account the wishes 
of the (transportation) industry. This industry has two branches, Ya and Y , each 
consisting of a representative private firm producing commodity a and b respectively. 
For instance, the first firm leases private cars to consumers and the second firm exploits 
the public bus system. 
There are h consumers, indexed by i=l,...,h. Each consumer i has a utility 
function M1(xj1,X21,ya1,y|J1,z) on X*=R +. Furthermore, each consumer i faces individual 
semi-public (quantity) constraints on the consumption ya* and y^1 of the private goods a 
and b. That means, each consumer is constrained in his' or her's car driving and public 
transportation because of the limitations of the road system. So, we assume that there are 
constraints y^(z) and y-^\z) for i=l,...,h, such that the consumption of consumer i is 
restricted by, 
ya* < Vfz) (3.1) 
The industry is aware of these (subjective) constraints because it observes 
rationing in the demand functions. Separate from these subjective feasibility constraints, 
the respective technical production constraints of the firms Ya and Yb are given by 
Fa(ya;x1a,x2a) < 0 (3.3) 
Fb(yb;X l b ,x2 b) < 0, (3.4) 
where Xja, x2 a and Xj , x2 respectively the amounts of inputs in the production of a 
and b respectively, and ya and y^ are the amounts of output of commodity a and b 
respectively. Moreover, we assume that firm Y faces a constraint 
yD < yb(z), (3.5) 
P.H.M. Ruys and G. van der Laan, Industrial equilibrium 6 
This constraint reflects the fact that the system of public transportation is restricted by 
the limitations of the road system. 
The enterprise producing the (public) infrastructure is given by the technical 
constraint 
F z(z;X l z ,x2 z) < 0, (3.6) 
with XjZ and x 2 z the amounts of inputs. Finally, there is a firm which produces the 
commodities 1 and 2 from a production factor. Initially there is a total amount w of this 
production factor available. The technical constraint of this firm is given by 
^ ( x ^ V ) < 0, (3.7) 
where Xj° and x 2° are the output amounts of the commodities 1 and 2 respectively. 
We assume that this economy, denoted by E = {(u1,y^,y^)1) i=l,...,h, Fa, (F°,y^), 
Fz, F°, w} is regular, i.e., the utility and production functions and the constraint 
functions are continuously differentiable, the utility functions ul are quasi-concave, the 
productions functions are concave, and w is positive. Furthermore we assume that in all 
technical constraints both the inputs and the outputs are measured positively. From this 
it follows that for re{a,b,z,o}, and for the variables v = x j° , x 2 ° , Xja , x 2 a , Xjb , x 2 b , 
x j z , x 2 z , y a , y b and z, holds 
8FT/Sv < 0 if v is an input, 
and 
SFT/Sv > 0 if v is an output. 
We are now ready to give some definitions. 
Definition 3.1. An allocation e = { (x jSx^y^y , , 1 ) , i=l,...,h, (ya ,Xja ,x2a), (yb ,Xjb ,x2 b) , 
(z,XjZ,x2z), (x2°,x20)} is in the set A of feasible allocations if the constraints (3.1)-(3.7) 
hold, and if 
Sj Xj1 + Xja + Xjb + Xjz < Xj° j -1 ,2 (3.8) 
Si Ya1 * Ya 0-9) 
^ y ^ < yb . (3.10) 
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Observe that this definition includes the subjective constraints (3.1) and (3.2). 
The quantity constraints (3.8)-(3.10) say that total demand is less than or equal to total 
supply. 
Pefinition 3.2. A feasible allocation e is efficiënt if there is a distribution of strictly 
positive individual weights &-v i=l,...,h, for which e maximizes the social welfare 
function 
over the set A of feasible allocations. 
According to Definition 3.2 the necessary conditions for an allocation of a 
regular economy to be efficiënt follow from the maximization problem, 
max ?• öi«1(x11,x21,ya1,yb1,z), (3.11) 
such that, with the shadow prices of the constraints between brackets, 
(a1) y»1 - ya\z) < 0 
Ü31) y ^ - yh\z) < 0 
(7) y b - 7b(z) < 0 
(Aa) Fa(ya;X l a ,x2 a) < 0 
(Ab) Fb(yb;X l b ,x 2 b) < 0 
(Az) Fz(z;Xlz ,x2z) < 0 
(A°) F0(x10,x2°;w) < 0 
G"j) S | X:1 + Xja + Xjb 
0*a) s i ya' * y a 
(Mb) s i y ^ * yb-
Differentiating the corresponding Lagrange function gives with respect to the variable 
between brackets, with j=l,2 and i=l,...,h: 
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(Xj1) 0j SMVSXJ1 - /i j - 'O 
(Ya1) *i Sul/Syi - a1 - /za = 0 
(yb i) *• Si/VSYb1 - /31 - Mb = O 
(ya) -Aa 5Fa/5ya + / i a = 0 
(Yb) -7 - Ab 5f b /5y b + Mb = O 
(z) Sj t?i 5«V5z + Sj a1 Sy^/Sz + Sj /31 Sy^/Sz + 7 Syb/<Sz - Az SFZ/Sz = O 
(Xja) Aa 5Fa/5xja + juJ = O 
(Xjb) Ab 5Fb /5xjb + ij = O 
(Xjz) Az 8FZ/Sx-Z + y? m O 
(Xj°) A° 5F 0 /5X j 0 - /P = 0 , 
with all shadow prices nonnegative. With commodity 1 taken as the numeraire, we obtain 
from these equations the next first order conditions for an efficiënt allocation. For all 
i=l,...,h, 
Su1/Sx21 SFT/Sx2T 
Stj/Sx^ SFr/Sxlr 
6tj/5yj SFa/5ya a{ 
Su^Sx^ -5F a /5xj a -XZ8FZ/Sx]7 
Sul/Syhl SFh/Syh 7 
for r€{a,b,o,z} (3.12) 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
SiS/Sx^ -SFb/8x]b -Xz8Fz/8x]z -Az5Fz/5xjZ 
Suk/Sz S k ak8yk/8z S k pk8yhk/8z i8yh/8z SFz/8z 
S k - r ,+ + + . (3.15) 
SiP/Suf -XZ8FZ/Sx]z -XZ8FZ/Sx]z -XZ8FZ/Sxlz -8Fz/8xlz 
Condition (3.12) is the usual condition for pure private goods, saying that the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) equals the marginal rate of transformation (MRT). 
Notice that for each firm the two private commodities are either both an output with 
positive derivative, or both an input with negative derivative. The latter fact explains 
the minus signs in (3.13)-(3.15). If ax=0 for all i, then no consumer feels himself 
constrained in the use of commodity a. This commodity is then a private good having a 
uniform MRS equal to the MRT between a and the numeraire commodity. However, if 
aS-0 for some i, then consumer i is willing to pay a mark-up on the MRT of 
commodity a in order to subsidize an expansion of the infrastructure. In the condition 
(3.14) for commodity b an extra term appears in the equation. This term reflects the 
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constraint of producer YD with respect to the availability z of the public good. If 7=0 
then the producer is not constrained and we have the same situation as for commodity a. 
If 7>0therwise, the second term on the right hand side of equation (3.14) reflects the 
additional costs the producer is willing to make for getting an expansion of the 
infrastructure, in order to enlarge his production possibilities. If /3S-0, then consumer i 
is willing to pay a mark-up on the costs of commodity b, including the costs the 
producer has to pay for the expansion. All the mark-ups and the producer's costs for 
expanding the public good reappear in (3.15). Notice that the mark-ups in (3.13) and 
(3.14) reveal the willingness to pay for weakening of the constraints j>a\ y^1 and y^, 
whereas the terms in (3.15) reveal the willingness to pay for an expansion of the 
infrastructure. We see that the sum of the MRS plus the sum of the mark-ups of the 
consumers plus the mark-up of the producer is equal to the MRT of the public good. If 
all mark-ups are equal to zero, then the public good behaves as a pure public good. 
The main advantage of introducing semi-public goods in this way is that an 
industrial economy can discriminate between agents who are and who are not 
constrained by the infrastructure, because it can observe demand-behaviour. This 
information can solve partially (and sometimes completely) the difficult problem of 
determining the individual contributions to the provision of a public good. 
4. The institutional framework. 
In this section we describe the institutional framework under which an industrial 
equilibrium can be formulated satisfying the first order conditions for efficiency. This 
institutional framework is the private ownership industrial economy. In the economy E 
there are four private good markets in operation: one for each good 1, 2, a and b. The 
demands and supplies on these markets depend on the prices p j , p2 , Pa and p^ 
respectively, with the price of the numeraire commodity, p j , equal to one. In an 
efficiënt allocation these prices are equal to the respective MRT's. For the fifth 
commodity, the public good, the situation is much more complicated. Later on we will 
make some simplifying assumptions. For the moment we deal with the general model 
given in the previous section. 
We assume that the industry is able to discriminate among consumers who are 
constrained and who are not. At some allocation e, let, for i=l,...,h, 
t ^ e ) = -a\\zSFz/8xlzyl 
and 
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%\e) = -p\\HFz/8xlzyl 
be the willingness of consumer i to pay for the weakening of the constraints ^ ( z ) and 
yb1(z) respectively. Then the sum of Ta*(e) = ta1(e)5j;a1/5z and T ^ e ) = tb1(e)5yb1/5z is 
his willingness to pay for the expansion of the infrastructure. Suppose that the 
willingness to pay is known to the industry. Of course this is not an innocuous 
assumption, but it can be approached in reality under the simplifications we will make 
later on. Furthermore, let tb(e)=-7/Az5Fz/5xjZ and Tb(e)=tb(e)$j>b/Sz be the willingness 
to pay of firm Y for weakening yJjz) and expanding z respectively. This information is 
of course known to the industry. Finally, at some allocation e, denote the marginal rate 
of substitution of consumer i between z and x^ by Pz\e), i=l,...,h. Now, the planner's 
task is to find the desired level of the infrastructure, i.e., to plan and to organize an 
amount z such that the sum of the MRS's plus the total willingness to pay is equal to the 
marginal rate of transformation, denoted by Pz(e). 
Planner's problem: Find z such that 
S£ \pz\&) + T^e) + T^e)] + Tb(e) = pz(e). (4.1) 
The price p z is the price to be paid by the planner for each unit of the public good and 
equals the MRT. On the other, hand the revenues of the planner consist of the 
consumers' contributions pz* per unit, and the mark-ups t * tt-1 and tb, per unit of 
consumption y a \ yb* and per unit of production yb, respectively. Since yb=SJyb1 if tb>0, 
the planner's profit 7rq(p,z), where p=(pj,p2,Pa,pb)T, equals 
Ap,z) = E£ pz*z + Ej {t^\l + (tb1 + tbJyb1] - pzz . 
"
 S i ^W + tb^b1) + tb^b - S i (Ta1 + Tb1)2 - Tb z-
To complete the description of the economy, we assume that the private firms 
are profit maximizing producers. We denote the respective profits by 7r°(p,z), 7ra(p,z), 
^"(p^) and ^(p.z). Since we assume that only firm producing the private commodities 
1 and 2 is endowed with a production factor, all individual labour and wealth in the 
economy is put in the production function F°. Wages are paid as profits. All profits are 
distributed among the consumers, with, for i=l,...,h and re{o,a,b,z,q}, <j>1T the share of 
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consumer i in the profit of firm (or planner) r. All shares are nonnegative and E- 0ir=l 
for all r. The income of consumer i at (p,z) is given by w1(p,z) = S r ^>iri^(p,z). 
We are now able to define an industrial eauilibrium for the economy E. Recall 
that a feasible allocation satisfies (3.1)-(3.10). 
Definition 4.1. An industrial equilibrium for the economy E is a feasible allocation e = 
{(x11,x21,ya1,yb1), i=l,...,h, (ya,x1a,x2a), (yb ,x1b ,x2b), (z,XjZ,x2z), (x1°,x20)}, a set of 
prices pj , P2, Pa, Pb for the private commodities and a price pz for the public good, a 
set of individual prices p z \ i=l,...,h, and a set of mark-ups t a \ t b \ i=l,...,h, and tb, 
such that 
1. for all i, (xj1,X21,ya1,y.j)1,z) maximizes u1(xj1,X21,ya1,y|J1,z) under the budget 
constraint 
PjXj1 + p2x2J + (Pa+ta^Ya1 + ( P b + V V W + pzz = wl(P>z) 
2. each producer maximizes profit subject to his technical constraint, i.e., 
7r°(p,z) - p1x10+p2x2° = max{p1x1o+p2x2o|FO(x1o,X2O;w)<0} 
jrz(p,z) - pzz-p1x1z-p2x2z = max{pzz-p1x1z-p2X2Z|irZ(2;x1z,X2Z<0)} 
7Ta(p,z) = Paya-Pix ia-P2x2a " max{paya-p1x1a-p2X2a|Fa(ya;x1a,x2a<0)} 
irb(p,z) = Pbyb-Plxlb_P2x2b = m a x {Pbyb" p l x l b " p 2 x 2 b | F b ( y b ' x l b ' x 2 b ) - 0 } 
3. for all i: t^1 > 0, implies yax = Jax(z) and t^1 > 0, implies y^1 = yu\z) 
4. tb > 0 implies yb = yu(z) 
5. (4.1) is satisfied, i.e., the planner equates marginal social costs with marginal social 
benefits of the public good 
6. (3.8)-(3.10) are satisfied with equalities, i.e., the markets clear demand and supply. 
Notice that the availability z of public good is completely determined by the 
planner. So, actually the consumers do not maximize their utility over z. Instead, the 
prices p^ are determined such that for all i, z is optimal under p z \ The same reasoning 
holds for the public good's producer, who determines pz given the amount z. The third 
condition has analogies in fixed price theory, from which it is well-known that 
quantity-constrained allocations can be sustained by virtual prices (see e.g. Neary and 
Roberts [12], Ruys [13] and Cornielje and van der Laan [4]. Here condition 3) says that 
P.H.M. Ruys and G. van der Laan, Industrial equilibrium 12 
a consumer is not willing to pay a mark-up on the cost price of a commodity if he or 
she is not constrained in the use of that commodity. Analogously, condition 4) says that 
the producer is willing to levy a mark-up on his output price p^ if he is constrained by 
the infrastructure level z. In this paper we assume that an equilibrium exists. We will 
address the existence problem in a subsequent paper, see also section 6. 
We now make some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume, without loss of 
the generality of our approach, that the public good does not appear in the utility 
function of the consumers, i.e., Pz1=0 for all i. In this case the consumers are only 
interested in the infrastructure if they are constrained. Now, the planner's problem 
becomes: find z such that 
Ei [ T ^ e ) + T ^ e ) ] + Tb(e) = pz(e). (4.2) 
Secondly, assume that the consumers' constraint functions are linear with constant term 
equal to zero, i.e., for all i, 
V ( z ) = a!z 
yh\z) = b*z. 
In general, we are not able to say anything about the concavity or convexity of the 
constraint functions. Both cases may occur. Therefore the assumption of linear functions 
is very simplifying, but not too bad. For simplicity we also assume that j/^(z)=bpz. Now 
(4.2) becomes 
Ei [a\\e) + b y t e ) ] + bPtb(e) = pz(e). 
From this it follows that the planner's profit becomes equal to zero. Moreover, the 
coefficients a1 and b1 follow from the consumption level of the goods a and b of the 
constrained consumers. The willingness to pay can be approached in reality if the 
consumers are partitioned in classes with different needs to expand the infrastructure. 
These needs can be inferred from the unconstrained demands for the goods a and b. 
Under these simplifying assumptions the planner can obtain enough information 
to decide upon the infrastructure level z, given the mark-ups on the cost prices p„ and 
p b . In this linear case, the infrastructure is completely financed by the returns on the 
mark-ups on the prices of the private goods. 
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5. Examples. 
For all firms we take constant returns to scale production functions, implying 
that the firm with production function F a , F b and Fz respectively, is cost minimizing 
with in equilibrium zero profit. The income of consumer i equals ftir0, with <f>x the 
share of i in the profit of the firm with production function F°. For the consumers we 
take Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Recall that we assume that z does not appear in 
these functions. Furthermore we assume that the consumers are not constrained in the 
use of commodity b, i.e., b1 = oo for all i. This gives the next example. For i=l,...,h, the 
utility of consumer i is given by 
u
1
 = p^ln x j 1 + p2 'ln x2x + paMn ya* + pb*ln yb* 
under ya* < a*z, where p11+P21+Pa1+Pb1 is normalized to one. The production constraints 
are given by, with all V;r>0» 
F° = ^ ( X ! 0 ) 2 + V2°(X2°)2 " w 2 * ° 
Fz = ln z - ip{z In x j 2 - ^ 2 Z l n ^2 * 0 w i t h ip^+^^l, 
and for rE{a,b,} 
Fx = ln y r - V>ir ln Xj r - i>2T ln x 2 r < 0 with ^1 ' r+^2 r=l-
For firm Y we have the quantity constraint yb<bpz. 
Given prices pj and p 2 we obtain from cost minimizing that for re{a,b,z} the 
conditional factor demand per unit of output is given by 
X l
r
 = ( A p 2 / B P l ) B (5.1) 
x 2
r
 = ( B P l / A p 2 ) A , (5.2) 
where A=V>jr, B=V2r- The zero profit condition gives 
p r = p l x i r + p 2 x 2 r - (5-3) 
Maximizing profit under F°<0 gives the private goods supply functions 
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Xj° = PjW/tfj0c j-1,2, (5.4) 
while the profit is given by 
TT0 = CW, (5.5) 
with c2 = P j 2 / ^ ! 0 + P22/V>2°-
Utility maximizing of consumer i under the budget constraint 
P l x l ' + P2X2' + (Pa+V^a1 + ( P b + V V " ^ c w 
gives for the consumer's demand 
Xj1 •-PjVcw/pj j - 1 , 2 (5.6) 
yaJ " ^a^ icw/(Pa+ta i) <5-7> 
y ^ - pbycw/(pb + tb) . (5.8) 
For given z and demand y a \ the mark-up tax is determined by firm Ya by setting 
t^ = max{0, (^Vcw/aM - pa). (5.9) 
So, the mark-ups are determined by the industry such that the individual demands do 
not exceed the individual constraints a*z. From (5.7) and (5.9) we obtain that 
ya* = PaVcw/pa and t^-0 if paVcw/pa < a*z (5.10) 
and 
ya* = a*z and ta* = p ^ c w / a ^ - p a if paVcw/pa > a*z. (5.11) 
Observe that the discrimination among consumers is determined by the parameters p a \ 
01 and a1. In fact, the willingness to pay increases with pa* and <j>1 and decreases with a1. 
Firm YD determines the mark-up tb on his output price p b such that the total demand 
yb does not exceed the constraint bpz. We obtain from (5.8) that 
tb = max{0, (Sj pbVcw/bPz) - pb), (5.12) 
Hence 
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y ^ P b V c w / : andt b = 0 if Ej / > b V W p b < bpz (5.13) 
and 
yb1 " V ^ c w / ' + t b ) a n d *b = ( S i Pb^ l c w / b P z ) " pb 
if Ej PbVcw/pb > bz (5.14) 
Finally the production /els ya and yb are set by the producers such that they are equal 
to the total consumptie i.e., 
y ^ E j y ^ a n c
 b = Siyhi. (5.15) 
Notice that yb=bpz if />bV*cw/pb > bpz. Consequently, given the prices Pj and pj 
and the infrastructure vel z, the values of all other variables, prices, quantities and 
mark-ups, can be calc ted through (5.1)-(5.15). So, the equilibrium problem is to find 
market prices Pj and p and a level z of the infrastructure such that the markets for the 
private commodities 1 id 2 clear and the mark-ups revenues are equal to the costs of 
the infrastructure, i.e., 
Ej x-1 + x:a + x = Xj - X:z, j = 1,2 (market-condition) 
S i a1^1 + bp tb oz. (planner-condition) 
In the next sec; i we discuss this problem both from a numerical and economie 
viewpoint. Here we cc entrate ourselves on the numerical results. Using the computer 
code described in van r Laan and Seelen [8] we have calculated the equilibrium with 
the following data. 
Example 1. Number of msumers: 4. Input: w = 100. Constraint coëfficiënt producer Y : 
b p = 4. The data of tlu ther coefficients are given in the Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1. Coefficients o he producers. 
Producer r = 0 b z 
^ ! r 1 .5 .5 
*2X 1 .5 .5 
P.H.M. Ruys and G. va der Laan, Industrial equilibrium 16 
Table 2. Coefficients of the consumers. 
Consumer i = 1 2 3 4 
>ii .4 .3 .2 .1 
P2] .1 .1 .1 .1 
< .5 .6 .7 .8 
v 0 0 0 0 
Profit shares ft .1 .2 .3 .4 
Constr. coef. a1 1 1 1 1 
Observe that the budget shares for commodity b are zero for all consumers. So, the 
demands for commodity b are zero, implying that firm Y b is not active and tj=0. The 
equilibrium values are given in Table 3 with the unconstrained demands (i.e., with ta1=0) 
between brackets. 
Table 3. Equilibrium values Example 1. 
?b ft*
0 
pnce 
mark-up t^ 
Producers: 
output 
input a 
b 
z 
Consumers: 
1 
2 
3 
5.4 
8.1 
8.1 
5.4 
0.905 1.902 1.902 1.902 
0 
74.2 67.1 
35.3 39.0 
0 0 
11.9 13.2 
1.5 
3.0 
4.5 
6.0 
37.1 
3.5 
8.5 
12.5 
(14.9) 
12.5 
(22.7) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
12.5 
0 13.5 
0 27.0 
).36 40.5 
1.54 53.9 
Example 2. Same data as in Example 1, except that the budget shares for the 
commodities a and b are equal to Pa1=0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, for i=l,...,4 respectively, and 
p ^ O . 4 for all i. The equilibrium values are given in Table 4 with again the 
unconstained demands between brackets. 
In the two examples the expenditures for the private commodities 1 and 2 are 
equal to each other. The only difference comes from the budget shares for a and b. So, 
the total budget share for the "public" sector is the same. This budget spent on the public 
sector finances the costs of the total output of the three firms. Since the three firms 
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have identical cost structure and have constant returns to scale, the total output of the 
three firms is equal for the two examples. However, in Example 1 all income spent on 
the public sector is spent on commodity a Because of the constraints on the use of this 
commodity it results in a higher need for the public good than in Example 2. 
Table 4. Equilibrium values Example 2. 
kl *b 
price 1 0.905 1.902 1.902 1.902 
mark-up t^ 0.136 
Producers: 
output 74.2 67.1 16.5 26.5 
(28.3) 
6.617 
input a 15.8 17.3 
b 25.2 27.8 
z 6.3 7.0 
Consumers: 
1 5.4 1.5 0.71 2.65 
(2.84) 
2 8.1 3.0 2.84 5.30 
(5.67) 
3 8.1 4.5 6.38 7.94 
(8.50) 
4 
5 4 
6.0 6.62 
01.3) 
10.59 
(H.3) 
4Ü> 
0 13.5 
0 27.0 
0 40.5 
1.36 53.9 
The results show that in the first example the consumers 3 and 4, being the 
consumers with the highest profit shares and the highest budget shares for a, are 
constrained in the use of the private commodity a. Notice that the sum of the mark-ups 
these consumers are willing to pay for an expansion of the infrastructure equals to the 
price of one unit of the public good. 
In example 2 for each consumer i the sum of the (unconstrained) demahds for a 
and b is equal to the (unconstrained) demand for a in the example 1. Observe that both 
the individual unconstrained demands for a and the total unconstrained demand for b 
are less than the corresponding constraint function values given the level of the 
infrastructure found in Example 1. So, for this level neither an individual nor the firm 
Yb is willing to pay. Consequently, the infrastructure has been cut down to the level at 
which the mark-ups are again high enough to cover the costs. In equilibrium, only 
consumer 4 is constrained in the use of a. Moreover the production of firm Y is 
constrained by the infrastructure, which results in a mark-up t^ on the price od 
commodity b, so that ta + 4t^ = pz, (planner-condition). 
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It is not difficult to gain some more insight from these examples. Decreasing the 
coefficients a1 will result in a higher willingness of the consumer to pay (see formula 
5.11)). To remain in equilibrium this induces a higher value of z, so that the producer 
would become unconstrained for low enough values of the consumers' constraint 
coefficients. In this case the infrastructure is financed by the consumers' mark-ups only. 
For example, taking a^O.75 for all i, the equilibrium values of t a \ t^ and z become 
t j 1 = 0 for i=l,2; t a 3 = 0.381; t a 4 = 2.155; t b = 0; and z = 7.09. 
On the other hand, increasing the coefficients a1 and/or decreasing the producer's 
constraint coëfficiënt b p results in a lower willingness of the consumer to pay and/or a 
higher mark-up t^ on the producer's price p^. For a^OJSi for i=l,...,4, and bp=2 we 
obtain that in equilibrium 
ta
J
=0 for all i, tb=0.95 and z=9.452. 
In this case the infrastructure is completely financed through the mark-up the producer 
is willing to levy on his price p^. Because the consumers are willing to spend 40% of 
their income on commodity b, the low constraint coëfficiënt b p enforces a (relatively) 
high level of z. In the first case the infrastructure can be seen as a public good for 
which. the willingness to pay expresses the marginal utility. In the latter case the 
infrastructure can be seen as an investment of producer Y , without which the producer 
is not able to produce anything. For both alternatives the prices are equal to those given 
in the examples. 
6. Concluding remarks and further research. 
This paper has been concerned with the problem of financing an infrastructure 
needed for operating and utilizing private services and commodities. The paper has to be 
seen as a first attempt to give a solid framework for the idea that the industry plays a 
central role in financing the infrastructure. In fact, the infrastructure is financed 
through mark-ups on the private services and commodities that make use of it. These 
mark-ups come from the constraints experienced by the agents. With respect to the 
consumers, the level of the infrastructure yields a (subjective) constraint on their private 
consumption. In case of producers the level of the infrastructure puts a constraint on 
their production possibilities. The mark-ups reveal these constraints and therefore the 
need for the infrastructure. Given the mark-ups the agents are willing to pay, the 
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planner determines the optimal level of the infrastructure. In subsequent papers we will 
develop this idea. 
A first question concerns the existence of an industrial equilibrium and the way 
in which the optimal level is determined. We want to make some remarks on this topic. 
Therefore we return to the previous section, in which we formulated the market-
condition and the planner-condition. To solve these equilibrium conditions we used a 
computer code based on simplicial approximation. We remark that the computational 
procedure adjusts prices and quantities until an approximate equilibrium has been found. 
It should be observed that all quantities are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and 
mark-ups. So, by setting Pj=l, we can take commodity 1 as the numeraire commodity. 
Then, for the examples considered in the previous section, the problem reduces to 
finding a price p£ and a quantity z such that the market-condition holds for j=2 and the 
planner-condition is satisfied. Then there is also equilibrium on the numeraire market 
(Walras' property), since all consumers spend all their income. The algorithm adjusts P2 
and z simultaneously until (approximate) equilibrium values have been reached. So, 
numerically the price p£ and the quantity z are determined simultaneously. However, 
from an economie viewpoint we may consider the following procedure. Suppose that, 
given p2, the industry (or planner) solves the planner-condition, i.e., given p£ the 
planner searches for a quantity z for which the planner-condition holds. Let z(p£) be 
this quantity as function of P2- On the other hand, let the market solve the market-
condition for j=2 given a quantity z. So, the market determines a price P2(z) for which 
the market for commodity 2 is in equilibrium. Starting with either some P2 or some z, 
the quantity z and pnee P2 are adjusted subsequently and alternately until a price P2 
and a quantity z are found such that 
• # * • 
z = z(p2 ) and p2 = p2(z ). 
# * 
Such a pair (p2 ,z ) solves the equilibrium problem. Using this "Nash formulation", in a 
subsequent paper we will investigate the conditions for the existence of an industrial 
equilibrium. One of the issues showing up is whether the constraint functions have to 
satisfy certain conditions. 
A second question concerns the problem of determining the mark-ups. We want 
to elaborate the idea that the individual mark-ups are determined by the industry and 
are corporated in the prices the producers set for their products. We may think of a 
partitioning of the consumers into a number of groups. Then for each group the industry 
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sets the mark-ups by considering a representative agent. So, in this way we get different 
prices for different types of agents. 
A third topic concerns the characterization of public goods by classifying the 
agents who pay for it. The examples have shown that within the same model the 
equilibrium may result in a situation in which either the consumers, or the producers, or 
both types of agents finance the infrastructure. This result urges us to be careful in 
making recommendations for the way in which the costs of public goods should be 
shared. In the near future we plan to do "cost-sharing" analysis for some (Dutch) "public 
sector" industries. 
P.H.M. Ruys and G. van der Laan, Industrial equilibrium 21 
REFERENCES 
[I] K.J. Arrow and G. Debreu, "Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy", 
Econometrica 26 (1954) 522-552. 
[2] W. Blümel, R. Pethig and O. Von dem Hagen, "The theory of public goods: a survey 
of recent issues", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142 (1986) 241-309. 
[3] R. Cornes and T. Sandler, The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986). 
[4] OJ.C. Cornielje and G. van der Laan, "The computation of quantity-constrained 
equilibria by virtual taxes", Economics Letters 22 (1986) 1-6. 
[5] M. Kojima and Y. Yamamoto, "A unified approach to the implementation of several 
restart fixed point algorithms and a new variable dimension algorithm", Mathematical 
Programming 28 (1984) 288-328. 
[6] H.W. Kuhn, "Simplicial approximation of fixed points", Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 
61 (1968) 1238-1242. 
[7] H.W. Kuhn, "Approximate search for fixed points", Computing Methods in 
Optimization Problems 2 (1969) 199-211. 
[8] G. van der Laan and L.P. Seelen, "Efficiency and implementation of simplicial zero 
point algorithms", Mathematical Programming 30 (1984) 196-217. 
[9] G. van der Laan and AJ.J. Talman, "A restart algorithm for computing fixed points 
without an extra dimension", Mathematical Programming 17 (1979) 74-84. 
[10] G. van der Laan and AJ.J. Talman, "A class of simplicial restart fixed point 
algorithms without an extra dimension", Mathematical Programming 20 (1981) 33-48. 
[II] L.W. McKenzie, "On the existence of general equilibrium for a competitive marker", 
Econometrica 27 (1959) 54-71. 
[12] J.P. Neary and K.W.S. Roberts, "The theory of household behaviour under 
rationing", European Economie Review 13 (1980) 25-42. 
[13] P.H.M. Ruys, "Disequilibrium characterized by implicit prices in terms of effort", 
in: J .EJ. Plasmans, ed., Econometrie modelling in theory and practice (Sijthoff & 
Noordhof f, 1982) pp. 1-29. 
[14] P.H.M. Ruys, "Algemeen evenwicht met semi-publieke goederen", in: P.A. Verheyen 
et all., eds., De praktijk van de econometrie, (Stenfert Kroese, Leiden, 1984) pp. 85-95. 
[15] P.A. Samuelson, "The pure theory of public expenditure", Review of Economics and 
Statistics 37 (1954) 350-356. 
[16] H. Scarf, "The approximation of fixed points of a continuous mapping", SI AM 
Journal of Applied Mathematics 15 (1967) 1328-1343. 
[17] H. Scarf, The computation of economie equilibria (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1973). 
[18] J. Von Neumann, "Über ein ökonomisches Gleichungssystem und eine 
Verallgemeinerung des Brouwerschen Fixpunktsatzes", Ergebnisse eines Mathematischen 
Kolloquiums 8 (1937) 73-83. 
[19] L. Walras, Éléments d'économie politique pure, (Corbaz, Lausanne, 1874). 
[20] A.H. Wright, "The octahedral algorithm, a new simplicial fixed point algorithm", 
Mathematical Programming 21 (1981) 47-69. 
i 
'T 
P.H.M. Ruys and G. van der Laan, Industrial equilibrium 22 
